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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
TEXAS REEXAMINES THE MEANING OF
'MINERALS': MOSER v. UNITED STATES
STEEL CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instruments which sever mineral interests from surface estates
often contain the term "minerals" in the description of the substances
severed.' When either the mineral or surface owner subsequently
desires to utilize a substance found under the land, disputes over
whether or not the substance is included in the classification "minerals"
often arise. Courts faced with such questions have struggled, with
mixed success, to formulate rules of law which will simultaneously ef-
fectuate the parties' intention, provide for certainty of land titles, and
promote the development of mineral resources.2
This judicial dilemma has been evident in Texas, which has ren-
dered a number of decisions redefining the term "minerals" in recent
years.' In Moser v. United States Steel Corp. ,4 its most recent encoun-
ter with such language, the Texas Supreme Court has adopted a rule of
interpretation based on Professor Eugene Kuntz' "manner of enjoy-
1. See, e.g., Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396, 398 (Okla. 1960) (form mineral deed
conveying an interest in "all of the oil, gas and other minerals" under the land granted); Vogel v.
Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 67, 141 P.2d 276, 280 (1943) (mineral deed conveying an interest in "oil,
petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt and all other minerals of every kind or character"); Heinatz v. Allen,
147 Tex. 512, _ 217 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1949) (devise of "the mineral rights"); Schwarz v. State,
658 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1983, writ pending) (patent reserving "all the miner-
als" to the state).
2. Professor Lowe has aptly described this struggle:
[Tihe more the courts attack [the issue of what substances are included in a grant or
reservation of "minerals or "other minerals], the more stuck they become. The uncer-
tainties, the delays, the litigation, and the liabilities that result are clearly counter-pro-
ductive to the legal system's goals of certainty and fairness as well as to society's goal of
greater energy self-sufficiency.
Lowe, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 117,
141 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (Reed I); Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977) (Reed!); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
4. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983). As of the time of this writing, the Moser case has
not yet been reported, as the court has not rendered a decision on a motion for rehearing.
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ment" theory.5 With the Moser decision, Texas has taken a major step
toward achieving fairness, title certainty, and maximum energy devel-
opment.6 This Recent Development will analyze the Moser decision,
assess its impact on Texas law, and recommend a similar approach for
Oklahoma, which has yet to adopt a consistent position on severances
of minerals.7
II. TEXAS LAW PRIOR TO MOSER
In earlier interpretations of severances of minerals, the Texas
courts sought to infer the parties' specific intention to convey or reserve
each substance under the land." Until 1971, the "ordinary and natural
meaning" of the term "minerals" was most often said to be the mean-
ing intended by the parties.9 The extent of damage to the surface
caused by extraction of a substance had been considered only one of
many factors in determining whether or not the substance was part of
the surface estate or the mineral estate. 10 In 1971, however, the Texas
Supreme Court elevated this factor to the status of a conclusive test in
Acker v. Guinn."1 Noting that a severance of minerals is intended to
create estates of value to the surface owner as well as the mineral inter-
est owner,12 the court held that unless otherwise specified "a grant or
5. See Kuntz, The LawRelating to Oiland Gas in Wyoming, 3 WYo. L.J. 107, 112-14 (1949);
see also infra notes 12, 52 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54-55, 64-67 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 73-94 and accompanying text.
8. Acker, 464 S.W.2d at 352 (citing Kuntz, supra note 5, at 112); Atwood v. Rodman, 355
S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc.,
337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
9. See, e.g.,Atwood, 355 S.W.2d at 212; Heinatz, 147 Tex. at __ 217 S.W.2d at 997. See
infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "ordinary and natural meaning"
test.
10. See, e.g., Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 998.
11. 464 S.W.2d 348 (rex. 1971). The case involved the extraction of iron ore by strip mining,
which would have impaired the surface uses of farming, ranching, and timber production. Id at
351.
12. Id at 352. The court thus partially adopted Professor Eugene Kuntz' "manner of enjoy-
ment" theory. According to this concept:
When a general grant or reservation is made of all minerals without qualifying lan-
guage, it should be reasonably assumed that the parties intended to sever the entire min-
eral estate from the surface estate, leaving the owner of each with definite incidents of
ownership enjoyable in distinctly different manners. The manner of enjoyment of the
mineral estate is through extraction of valuable substances, and the enjoyment of the
surface is through retention of such substances as are necessary for the use of the surface,
and these respective modes of enjoyment must be considered in arriving at the proper
subject matter for each estate.
Kuntz, supra note 5, at 112, cited with approval in Acker, 464 S.W.2d at 352; see also 1 E. KuNTz,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAs § 13.3, at 305-07 (1962) (later articulation of manner of
enjoyment theory).
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reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral rights' should not be construed to
include a substance that must be removed by methods that will, in ef-
fect, consume or deplete the surface estate."' 3
This "surface destruction" test was clarified and modified twice in
the decade following Acker. In Reed v. Wylie (Reed ),t4 the Texas
Supreme Court required classification of a substance as part of the sur-
face estate if the surface owner proved that, "as of the date of the in-
strument being construed, if the substance near the surface had been
extracted, that extraction would necessarily have consumed or depleted
the land surface." 5 Certain aspects of the ReedI opinion were "reex-
amined" in Reed v. Wylie (ReedII).16 Under the Reed II test, instead
of needing to prove that extraction of substances near the surface
"would necessarily" destroy the surface, the surface owner needed only
to show that "any reasonable method" of extraction would result in
surface destruction. 7 To increase title certainty, the court held that the
availability and destructive impact of reasonable methods of extraction
were to be judged as of the time of litigation, rather than as of the time
of the conveyance as under Reed 1.18
The surface destruction test was widely criticized.' 9 The factual
determinations required made it impossible to determine title to un-
specified substances from the instrument alone. Under the Reed I test,
before rendering an opinion on ownership of a substance, a title exam-
13. Acker, 464 S.W.2d at 352.
14. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977). This case involved the extraction of coal and lignite. Id at
170.
15. Id at 172. Substances "at" the surface belonged to the surface estate without proof of the
method of extraction. Id at 173.
16. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
17. Id at 747. The court held that substances "near" the surface were those within 200 feet
of the surface of the parcel of land in question, or of land in the reasonably immediate vicinity.
Id at 748. If the substance was "near" the surface and the surface destructiveness test was met,
the substance belonged to the surface owner at all depths. Id
18. id at 747.
19. See, e.g., Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uranium and Coal by Surface Methods: Acker
v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REv. 451 (1976); Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs." Conflicts Between
Surface and Mineral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 995, 1014-20 (1980); Lowe, supra
note 2; Maxwell, The Meaning ofMinerals-he Relationship of Interpretation and Surface Burden,
8 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 255 (1976); Norvell, Developing Lands Characterized by Separate Ownership
of Oil and Gas and Surface Minable Coal and Uranium-The Other Side of Acker v. Guinn and Its
Progeny, 33 INsT. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 193 (1982); Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral-
The Surface Destruction Test andMore, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 879 (1977); Comment, Lig'nite-Sur-
face or Mineral? The Single Test Causes Double Trouble, 28 BAYLOR L. RFv. 287 (1976); Com-
ment, Surface or Mineral A Single Test?, 23 BAYLOR L. REv. 407 (1971); Note, Ownership of
UnspecFfed Minerals in Texas and OklahomaAfter Reed v. Wylie II, 16 TULSA L.J. 511 (1981); see
also Homer, Lignite-Surface or Mineral?, 31 ARK. L. REv. 75 (1977) (discussing Acker in context
of other states' decisions).
[Vol. 19:448
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iner would have to inspect the land itself to determine whether the sub-
stance was at the surface or was located within 200 feet of the surface
anywhere in the reasonably immediate vicinity of the parcel. The ex-
aminer would also have to determine whether any reasonable method
of extraction of the substance would destroy the surface.2 0 Surface and
mineral owners would doubtless hold different opinions concerning
these issues, thus necessitating time-consuming litigation in many in-
stances before the substance could be developed.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Mosers2' and the Gefferts22 owned neighboring ranches. The
Moser property was originally separated from the Gefferts' property by
a winding road.23 After the road was straightened in 1949, a 6.77-acre
tract of the Moser ranch was isolated on the side of the road adjacent to
the Geffert property. A 6.42-acre parcel of Geffert land was similarly
separated from the main tract across the road adjacent to the Moser
property.24 For the sake of convenience, in 1949 the landowners ex-
changed ownership of the surface estates of the isolated parcels, reserv-
ing "all of the oil, gas and other minerals" thereunder.2 5 After deposits
of uranium were discovered on the 6.77-acre tract, the Mosers sued the
Gefferts to quiet title to the uranium. The Gefferts counterclaimed, ar-
guing that uranium was one of the "other minerals" reserved by their
1949 deed.26
The case was tried in 1979, when the ReedI decision was the most
current statement of Texas law.27 Applying the Reed I test,28 the jury
found that mining the uranium would not have necessitated substantial
surface destruction.29 Thus, the trial court held that the uranium be-
20. Reed!l, 597 S.W.2d at 750 (Spears, J., concurring).
21. The Mosers were executors and trustees of the estate of their predecessor in title to the
ranch. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 427 n.1.
22. The defendants included the Gefferts and all others who owned a mineral interest in the
tract in question. Id at 427 n.2.
23. Id at 427.
24. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1980), aft'd, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (1983).
25. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 427.
26. Id The Gefferts also argued that the Mosers should be estopped from claiming owner-
ship of the uranium since they had leased the uranium on the 6.42-acre tract in which they owned
the mineral estate. Moser, 601 S.W.2d at 732. The appeals court found it unnecessary to decide
the estoppel issue, as it held that the Gefferts owned the uranium as a matter of law. Id at 734.
27. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 427.
28. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
29. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 427. The uranium was to be mined using the "solution
1984]
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longed to the Gefferts, as owners of the mineral estate.30
The Mosers appealed the trial court's decision. The ReedIZ clari-
fication of the surface destruction test was rendered while the case was
on appeal.3" The Eastland Court of Civil Appeals, applying the Reed
II test retroactively,32 held that as the only reasonable method of ex-
tracting the uranium would not have depleted or destroyed the surface,
the uranium was a mineral as a matter of law.33
IV. HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower
court in Moser,34 but in doing so abandoned the surface destruction
rule.35 The court recognized that the surface owner's rights to enjoy-
ment of his estate were overemphasized by the holdings in Acker, Reed
I, and Reed II. While "the general intent of parties executing a min-
eral deed or lease is presumed to be an intent to. . .convey all valua-
ble substances to the mineral owner ... . under the surface
destruction test title to substances of value would nonetheless belong to
the surface owner if extraction would damage the surface.37 In Moser,
the court reasoned that the surface owner's rights could be adequately
protected under a rule that separated the issues of the ownership of
minerals and the right to use the surface to produce them. Thus, the
court held that, with certain exceptions, 38 "a severance of minerals in
an oil, gas and other minerals clause includes all substances within the
ordinary and natural meaning of that word, whether their presence or
value is known at the time of extraction. '39 The mineral owner has the
right to reasonably use the surface to the extent necessary for the re-
moval of all such substances, whether or not removal will result in sur-
mining" technique. This process involves drilling wells to the uranium ore horizons, injecting
solvents to dissolve the ore, and pumping the solution to the surface for processing. Moser, 601
S.W.2d at 734.
30. Maoser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 427.
31. Id
32. Moser, 601 S.W.2d at 734.
33. Id As the uranium was 193 feet below the surface at its highest point, the "near surface"
test was applicable. Id at 733-34.
34. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 427.
35. Id at 428.
36. Id at 429 (citing Kuntz, supra note 5, at 113).
37. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
39. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429.
[Vol. 19:448
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face destruction.4° This right, however, is limited by a duty to
compensate the surface owner for all surface destruction caused by rea-
sonable or unreasonable removal of substances not specifically named
in the severance of "minerals. 41
A. "Ordinary and Natural Meaning' Rule
As noted above, in the years preceding Acker Texas courts often
applied the "ordinary and natural meaning" rule of interpretation to
severances of minerals.42 The specific requirements of the rule tended
to vary from court to court. One court held all substances "commonly
regarded as minerals as distinguished from the soil in general" to be
part of the mineral estate.43 Another stated that "the true test is what
["minerals"] means in the vernacular of the mining and mineral indus-
try, the commercial world, and the land owners at the time of the grant
.44 Substances which are "rare and exceptional in character or
possess peculiar property giving them special value" have also been
held to be within the ordinary and natural meaning of "minerals. 45
The Moser court itself offered no suggestions for application of the
test, merely concluding that "uranium is a mineral within the ordinary
and natural meaning of the word. 46 Thus, presumably the formula-
tions of the test prior to Acker are the best indications of the current
state of the law. If so, the Texas Supreme Court's attempt to increase
certainty of land titles may fall somewhat short of its goals, as title
examiners will still have to determine some factual issues. The way in
which people experienced in mining, commerce, and agriculture inter-
pret the term "minerals" is a question of fact which will require the
testimony of experts in those fields.47 Although Texas courts have con-
40. Id This right of surface use is not absolute. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying
text.
41. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429.
42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
43. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd)
(such substances are "legally cognizable minerals").
44. Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960,
writ ref d n.r.e.); accordPsencik 205 S.W.2d at 661 (citing Waring v. Foden, [1932] 1 Ch. 276, 294).
45. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, _ 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949). The Atwood court ex-
pressed its opinion that this statement in Heinatz was merely dictum. 355 S.W.2d at 215. How-
ever, the earlier Psencik opinion (which, like Heinatz, cited the Waring case) stated that the word
"minerals" includes "substances exceptional in use, in value and in character." 205 S.W.2d at 661.
46. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429.
47. These experts may also be asked to give their opinions "as to the nature of the [sub-
stance], its relation to the surface of the land, its use and value, and the method and effect of its
removal." Heinatz, 217 S.W.2d at 995-96.
1984]
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sistently rejected a scientific or technical definition of "minerals, ' 48 the
opinion of an expert in mining or business may be based in part on the
scientific meaning of the term. Factual issues as to whether a given
substance has "exceptional characteristics" or "special value" may also
necessitate litigation. Further, if the ordinary and natural meaning of
the language is to be determined as of the time of the conveyance, as
was suggested in a case decided prior to Acker,49 the present-day title
examiner may have difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of "miner-
als" in the vernacular at the date of execution. On the other hand, if
the "exceptional" or "valuable" character of the substance is to be eval-
uated under the current vernacular, title to a substance may shift from
the surface to the mineral estate as technologies of extracting and using
the substance improve over time. °
Adoption in full of Kuntz' manner of enjoyment theory might
have eliminated much of the title uncertainty which remains in Texas
as a result of Moser."s According to Kuntz, "the severance should be
construed to sever from the surface all substances presently valuable in
themselves, apart fom [sic] the soil, whether their presence is known or
not, and all substances which become valuable through development of
the arts and sciences." 2 Title to any unnamed substance would be as-
certainable from the face of the severance alone under this formula-
48. See Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096, 1099-101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ
refd); accordPsencik, 205 S.W.2d at 659. The reasoning behind this rejection was well stated by
the Supreme Court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903):
The word "mineral" is used in so many senses, dependent upon the context, that the
ordinary definitions of the dictionary throw but little light upon its signification in a
given case. Thus the scientific division of all matter into the animal, vegetable or min-
eral kingdom would be absurd as applied to a grant of lands, since all lands belong to the
mineral kingdom, and therefore could not be excepted from the grant without being
destructive of it.
Id at 530. For this reason, courts have held that if the parties intended "minerals" to be inter-
preted in a scientific or technical sense, they must have clearly indicated that intention. Heinatz,
217 S.W.2d at 997. Cf. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 160 (1981) (words are to be interpreted "in their
ordinary and popular sense ... unless used by the parties in a technical sense"). Oklahoma cases
rejecting a technical interpretation of "minerals" include Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396,
399 (Okla. 1960); Beck v. Harvey, 196 Okla. 270, 272, 164 P.2d 399, 401 (1944); and Vogel v.
Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 67-68, 141 P.2d 276, 280 (1943).
49. Fleming, 337 S.W.2d at 852.
50. Cf. Lowe, supra note 2, at 139-40 (discussing the possibility of shifting ownership of sub-
stances under the ReedlI test).
51. The Moser court may have been reluctant to discard the ordinary and natural meaning
rule for several reasons, including a fear that it would thwart the parties' intentions if it aban-
doned the search for a specific intent, a hesitation to reverse precedent based on inferences of
specific intent, and a belief that to do so would be unfair to the surface owner. Lowe, supra note 2,
at 141; see also Broyles, supra note 19, at 476 (discussing stare decisis).
52. Kuntz, supra note 5, at 113.
[Vol. 19:448
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tion," thus reducing the need to litigate factual disputes. The inclusion
of both presently and prospectively valuable substances as "minerals"
would also eliminate the possibility of shifting ownership.
Despite its drawbacks, the Moser test is a significant improvement
over the surface destruction rule. No longer will parties to a convey-
ance have to investigate the physical characteristics of the land and sur-
rounding territory or the available extraction technology to determine
ownership of unspecified substances. 4 Further, the Moser court may
have reduced the scope of future litigation when it stated that its previ-
ous decisions holding certain substances not to be minerals as a matter
of law would be given effect without application of the ordinary and
natural meaning test.
To protect the interests of parties who may have relied on the sur-
face destruction test in granting or reserving interests in minerals, the
Texas Supreme Court has stated that all such contracts, leases and
deeds executed after Acker and before Moser will be interpreted under
the law in effect at the time of the conveyance5 6 While this exception
to the Moser rule is equitable, it will create interesting problems for
title examiners and the courts. Not only will title examiners have to
investigate the facts surrounding such conveyances,5 7 but they will also
need to ascertain the state of the law at the time of execution. Sever-
ances prior to 1980 will be especially difficult to interpret, as prior to
ReedII the parameters of the surface destruction test were not entirely
clear .5  The Moser opinion also leaves uncertain the status of title to
unspecified "minerals" claimed by a party who acquired an interest
53. See Note, supra note 19, at 526.
54. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
55. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429. The court cited several Texas decisions as examples,
including Heinatz, 147 Tex. at -, 217 S.W.2d at 997 (building stone and limestone); Atwood, 355
S.W.2d at 216-17 (limestone, caliche and surface shale); Fleming, 337 S.W.2d at 852 (fresh water);
and Psencik, 205 S.W.2d at 661-62 (sand and gravel). In addition, certain decisions may be inter-
preted as including some substances in the mineral estate as a matter of law. See Moser, 26 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. at 428-29 (court, stating, "We now.. . hold that title to a substance which we have
determined to be a mineral is held by the owner of the mineral estate as a matter of law," held
uranium to be a mineral); see also Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378
S.W.2d 50, 55 (Tex. 1964) (natural gas); Ambassador Oil Corp. v. Robertson, 384 S.W.2d 752, 763
(rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (salt water); Luse, 217 S.W. at 1101 (oil and gas).
By overruling Acker and Reed II, the Moser court may have implicitly held that iron ore and
lignite also belong to the mineral estate. See Schwartz v. State, 658 S.W.2d 822, 823 (rex. Ct.
App.-Austin 1983, writ pending) (court, following Moser, held coal and lignite to be "minerals").
56. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430. This holding applies to instruments executed between
February 10, 1971, and June 8, 1983. Id.
57. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
1984]
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between 1971 and 1983 from a grantor whose title is derived from a
mineral severance predating Acker.59
B. Compensation of Suiface Owner for Damage Caused
by Mineral Extraction
As a general rule, "The mineral owner, as owner of the dominant
estate, has the right to make any use of the surface which is necessarily
and reasonably incident to the removal of the minerals. ' 60 In the past,
this right has been limited only by a prohibition against negligent or
excessive use of the surface while extracting minerals,61 the accommo-
dation doctrine,62 and a duty to comply with reclamation statutes.63
After the Moser decision, an additional duty governs the mineral own-
er's use of the surface while extracting minerals not specifically named
in the grant or reservation of mineral rights. Although the mineral
owner may still make reasonable use of the surface to recover all min-
59. As an example, assume that a severance of "all the mineral rights" takes place in 1970. In
1981, the surface owner, relying on Reed 11's holding that lignite at the surface belongs to the
surface estate, leases the lignite rights. Under Moser, the 1981 lease is valid under the ReedI
test. However, the surface owner's title is derived from a 1970 severance, which if considered
alone would be governed by the ordinary and natural meaning test. Thus, assuming lignite would
be considered part of the mineral estate under the law prior to Acker, it is debatable whether a
court would hold that the surface owner had any rights in the lignite to convey to the lessee.
60. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429. The mineral owner's right of surface use may, how-
ever, be limited by contract. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134-35
(Tex. 1967).
61. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429; see, e.g., Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84,344 S.W.2d 863
(1961); Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941, writ
ref'd). The surface owner may obtain injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. See, e.g.,
Speedman Oil Co. v. Duval Cty. Ranch Co., 504 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973,
writ refd n.r.e.); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Bright & Schiff, 321 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430. The accommodation doctrine, also known as the "due
regard" doctrine, provides that:
[W]here there is an existing use by the surface owner which would otherwise be pre-
cluded or impaired, and where under the established practices in the industry there are
alternatives available to the lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of
reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee.
Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483
S.W.2d 808, 812 (rex. 1972) (lessee must resort to alternative methods of recovery only when they
can be employed on the leased premises).
63. Eg. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(1982); Texas Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); Texas Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, Tax. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. §§ 131.001-.270 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1982-1983); see Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at
429 n.4; see also Broyles, supra note 19, at 469-72. In addition, it may not be unreasonable to
predict the judicial creation of a duty to restore the surface, since courts' focus seems to have
shifted from determining mineral ownership to limiting the surface easement. See Tenneco Oil
Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1973); Lowe, supra note 2, at 142-43. See generally Maxwell,
supra note 19 (discussion of the limitations of the mineral owner's surface easement).
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erals,64 if he damages or destroys the surface while extracting unnamed
minerals he must pay compensation to the surface owner. 5
The reasoning behind this requirement is logical and persuasive.
The Moser court stated:
It is reasonable to assume a grantor who expressly conveys a
mineral which may or must be removed by destroying a por-
tion of the surface estate anticipates his surface estate will be
diminished when the mineral is removed. It is also probable
the grantor has calculated the value of the diminution of his
surface in the compensation received for the conveyance.
This reasoning is not compelling when a grantor conveys a
mineral which may destroy the surface in a conveyance of
"other minerals. ' 66
Thus, the court felt a requirement of additional compensation of the
surface owner for damages caused by extraction of unnamed sub-
stances furthered the intention of the parties.67
The Moser court did not specify the method to be used in calculat-
ing the compensation owed for surface damages. While Kuntz sug-
gested that "[s]uch damages [should] not be measured by the value of
the substance in its new use, but [should] be measured by the reduction
in value of the land for its surface use," 68 the general remedy provided
in Texas for tortious injury to real property depends on the extent of
the injury.6 9 If the land is destroyed, the owner may recover its fair
market value at the time of its destruction.70 If the land is permanently
damaged, the owner is entitled to the difference in its fair market value
immediately before and after the injury.71 Finally, should the land be
only temporarily damaged, the tortfeasor is liable for the cost to restore
the land to its prior condition.72 It remains to be seen whether Texas
courts will apply Kuntz' suggestion or will utilize existing remedies.
As this discussion indicates, the full implications of the Moser de-
cision cannot be evaluated at present. This uncertainty will limit the
64. Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430.
65. Id at 429.
66. Id; see also Kuntz, supra note 5, at 115.
67. Moser, 26 Tex, Sup. Ct. J. at 429.
68. Kuntz, supra note 5, at 115.
69. Trinity & S. Ry. v. Schofield, 72 Tex. 496, -, 10 S.W. 575, 576-77 (1889). See generally
Jones, Escape of Deleterious Substances: Strict Liability vs. Liabiliy Based upon Fault, 1 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 163 (1955) (thorough discussion of various methods of computing damages in
mining states, as well as a comprehensive compilation of caselaw).
70. Schofield, 72 Tex. at -, 10 S.W. at 576.
71. Id
72. Id at 576-77.
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rule's usefulness in decreasing litigation until Texas courts clearly de-
fine and apply the ordinary and natural meaning test.
V. IMPACT OF MOSER IN OKLAHOMA
A. Present State of Oklahoma Law
When interpreting the scope of the term "minerals" or "other min-
erals," the paramount objective of Oklahoma courts has been to dis-
cover the intention of the parties at the time of the severance.7 3 Courts
will not apply rules of construction to ascertain the meaning of a con-
veyance if the intention of the parties can be ascertained from the "four
corners" of the instrument.74 Thus, in Panhandle Cooperative Royalty
Co. v. Cunningham" the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a mineral
deed granting an interest in "oil, gas and other minerals" was unambig-
uous and included only oil and gas, their constituents and compo-
nents.76 Although the holding in Panhandle seemed to be restricted to
the facts of the case,77 apparently a majority of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has construed Panhandle as applicable to any severance of "oil,
gas and other minerals. ' 78 However, language such as "all minerals,"
"the mineral rights," or "oil, gas, coal and other minerals" would not
73. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 152 (1981);see, e.g., Butlerv. State, 53 OKLA. B.J. 130, 136 (Jan. 19,
1982) (Hargrave, J., concurring specially); Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396, 398 (Okla.
1960); Rush v. Champlin Ref. Co., 321 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Okla. 1958).
74. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 154-57 (1981); see Butler, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 135-37 (Hargrave, J.,
concurring specially); see also Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108, 114
(Okla. 1971); Erwin v. Poole, 446 P.2d 601, 602 (Okla. 1968); Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d
955, 960 (Okla. 1964); Cronkhite, 352 P.2d at 399.
75. 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971).
76. Id at 113.
77. The court's holding in Panhandle was based on the rule that the meaning of a conveyance
must be ascertained from the instrument as a whole, giving effect to each part. Id (citing OKLA.
STAT. tit. 15, §§ 155, 157 (1981)). The grant of "oil, gas and other minerals" was contained in a
"Mineral Deed" which stated that the mineral interest conveyed was subject to future oil and gas
leases and which made provision for the payment of bonus and rentals from any future oil and gas
lease. 1d at 111. These provisions led the court to state that the parties were obviously "preoccu-
pied with oil and gas, that oil and gas was dominating the attention and the intention of the parties
to the conveyance." 1d at 112. Thus, the phrase "and other minerals" was held to unambigu-
ously limit the grant to components and constituents of oil and gas. Id at 113.
78. See Allen v. Farmers Union Co-Op. Royalty Co., 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975). In.Alen, a
reservation of "all oil, gas & mineral rights" in the initial severance of minerals from land was
held, under the Panhandle rule, to include only "oil, gas and other minerals produced as a compo-
nent or constituent thereof." Id at 208. Unlike Panhandle, however, it does not appear that the
instrument of severance contained any provisions concerning oil and gas lease rights. Thus, the
court apparently interpreted Panhandle as stating a universal rule of law applicable to any convey-
ance of "oil, gas and other minerals," whether or not other language in the instrument indicated
the parties' "preoccupation" with oil and gas. See Butler, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 135 (Hargrave, J.,
concurring specially) (noting that the Allen court acknowledged the correct, narrow rule of Pan.
handle only in dicta in an alternative holding).
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be governed by this broad reading of Panhandle.7 9
When an ambiguity is found in an instrument, severances of min-
erals will be interpreted under established rules of construction. Al-
though the Oklahoma legislature has enacted several such rules into
law, 0 a non-statutory rule, that of ejusdem generis, is almost always
applied by state courts to severances of minerals.8 Under ejusdem
generis, "where specific minerals are enumerated along with a general
mineral grant or reservation, the court may conclude that the parties
had in mind only those minerals which have characteristics in common
with the enumerated minerals."82 This rule has been criticized for its
difficulty of application83 and inconsistency of results,84 but has not yet
lost favor in Oklahoma.
79. See Allen, 538 P.2d at 207 (court indicated that scope of the phrase "mineral rights"
might be different if "standing alone").
80. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 159-176 (1981).
81. See, e.g., Sloan v. Peabody Coal Co., 547 F.2d 115, 116 (10th Cir. 1977);41len, 538 P.2d
at 207; Panhandle, 495 P.2d at 114; Cronkhite, 352 P.2d at 399; Beck v. Harvey, 196 Okla. 270, 271-
72, 164 P.2d 399, 401 (1944); Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 67-68, 141 P.2d 276, 280 (1943); Wolf v.
Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 77 Okla. 81, 82-83, 186 P. 484, 484-85 (1920); West v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 536 P.2d 393, 397-99 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
82. 1 E. KuNTz, supra note 12, § 13.3, at 304.
83. Texas courts have consistently refused to apply ejusdem generis to grants or reservations
of "minerals." In Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, writ ref'd)
the court explained the reason for its refusal to use the doctrine in construing a reservation of "all
the coal and mineral":
If we should apply the rule of ejusdem generis, what qualities or peculiarities of the
specified type, "coal," shall be considered in determining the classification intended by
the use of the word "mineral"? Are we to classify according to value? If so, can it be
said that oil or gas on the one hand and coal on the other are of different kinds or species
of minerals? If we classify as to use, is it not true that all three are used for fuel? Shall
the classification be determined by the form, density, color, weight, value, or uses of the
particular species mentioned? Taking either value, use, or nature of origin as the basis of
the classification mentioned, can we say that oil and coal do not belong to the same
class? It is true that coal in its commercial form is found in a solid state, while oil is a
liquid. But are we justified in limiting the minerals intended to be included in the reser-
vation to those only which are found in a solid state? Such evident difficulty in applying
the rule of ejusdem generis to the terms of the reservation under consideration renders it
an unsafe guide, and we do not believe any aid in the interpretation of the terms used in
the reservation will be afforded by such rule.
217 S.W. at 1099; see also Moser, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 428; Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964); Note, supra note 19, at 521, 526.
84. See Butler, 53 OKLA. B.J. at 134 (Hargrave, J., concurring specially) (arguing that "the
Court should allow the parties to utilize all traditional avenues of construction to resolve the
ambiguity, rather than singling out ejusdem generis as the only available aid to resolution."); see
also 1 E. KuNTz, supra note 12, § 13.3, at 304; Note, supra note 19, at 521 & n.79 (noting factual
determinations required under efusdem generis). But see Emery, ffhat Suiface is Mineral and
hat Mineral is Surface, 12 OKLA. L. REv. 499, 500-01, 516 (1959) (contention that ejusdem
generis is the proper constructional aid and promotes certainty of titles).
85. See, e.g., Allen, 538 P.2d at 207-08 (applies ejusdem generis).
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When ejusdem generis is inapplicable, 6 however, Oklahoma
courts have turned to other rules of construction to aid in interpreting
ambiguous instruments. Notably, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
cited with approval the rule enunciated in Texas that "minerals" is to
be construed according to its meaning in the vernacular of mining,
commerce and land ownership. 7 More recently, in Holland v. Dolese
Co. ,88 the court applied the exceptional characteristics test, as well as
parts of the manner of enjoyment theory, in holding that limestone is
not part of the mineral estate under a reservation of "the mineral
rights. ' 9
The extent to which the latter test has become part of Oklahoma
law is unclear. The Holland court cited Kuntz' proposition that min-
eral owners be required to pay compensation for surface damages
caused by removal of unnamed substances,90 but did not have to apply
the principle as it held the substance in question part of the surface
estate.91 The opinion in a later case applying the manner of enjoyment
theory,92 as well as ejusdem generis,93 to the question of whether brine
and iodine were included in a grant of "all the oil, gas and other miner-
als" was withdrawn for unspecified reasons.94
B. A Proposalfor Oklahoma
Under the current state of the law, the next Oklahoma court faced
86. The doctrine cannot be used to interpret instruments which grant or reserve "all miner-
as" without mentioning specific substances. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
87. Mack Oil, 389 P.2d at 961 (language indicating "all mineral rights reserved" construed as
conveying water with the surface estate); see supra note 44.
88. 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975).
89. Id at 550-52.
90. Id at 551.
91. Id at 552.
92. Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co., 51 OKLA. B.J. 2686, 2687-88 (Nov. 12, 1980), withdrawn, 53
OKLA. B.J. 2602 (Oct. 21, 1982).
93. Id
94. 53 OKLA. B.J. 2602 (Oct. 21, 1982). The Oklahoma Supreme Court subsequently af-
firmed the trial court's judgment in an unpublished memorandum opinion. Eike v. Amoco Prod.
Co., No. 52,511 (Okla. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 8, 1983) (mem. per curiam) (disposition noted at 54
OKLA. B.J. 414 (1983)). The trial court had held the brine water and iodine in controversy to be
part of the surface estate, but did not state the legal theory upon which its conclusion was based.
Exhibit A at 5, Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 52,511 (Okla. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 8, 1983) (trial
court's conclusions of law). In dissenting from the Oklahoma Supreme Court's action, Justice
Doolin cited Kuntz' manner of enjoyment theory, as well as ejusdem generis, for his opinion that
"when the mineral estate is severed, the mineral owner. . . has the right to take the brine water
into his temporary possession and extract therefrom and reduce to ownership any minerals, such
as ... iodine." Eike v. Amoco Prod. Co., No. 52,511, at 5 (Okla. Sup. Ct. fied Feb. 8, 1983)
(Doolin, J., dissenting).
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with an interpretation of the term "minerals" may have an opportunity
to follow the Moser rule or to adopt Kuntz' theory in its entirety. To
achieve the greatest degree of title certainty and to encourage develop-
ment of all mineral resources, the court should choose the latter
course.95  The court can initially declare as a matter of law that the
grant or reservation is unambiguous, thus rendering rules of construc-
tion such as ejusdem generis inapplicable.96 Next, recognizing the par-
ties' lack of specific intent concerning ownership of unnamed
substances, the court can give effect to the general intent to sever all
presently and prospectively valuable substances from the surface es-
tate.97 In the interest of fairness, the court can continue to adhere to
prior Oklahoma decisions holding certain substances as non-miner-
als.98 Then, to protect the surface estate from unforeseen diminution in
value, the court can impose on the mineral estate a duty to compensate
the surface owner for damages resulting from extraction of unnamed
"minerals." 99
Since Moser provided no guidance as to the amount of damages,
Oklahoma courts are free to fashion a just remedy. As noted above,
Kuntz has suggested that damages be measured by the diminution in
value of the surface estate due to the extraction of unspecified miner-
als."° Oklahoma may adopt this position or may choose to apply its
common-law remedies, similar to those of Texas, 1 1 for tortious injury
to realty.' 02 It is also possible that a court may characterize the mineral
95. While the Moser rule, based as it is on Kuntz' theory, would also represent an improve-
ment over the ejusdem generis rule, Oklahoma would be inviting litigation by adopting the "ordi-
nary and natural meaning" element of the Moser test without defining that meaning in Kuntz'
terms. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 154-55 (1981). Application of the manner of enjoyment theory is
apparently permitted under Oklahoma's statutory rules of interpretation notwithstanding the lack
of an ambiguity in the instrument. See id
97. See supra note 12.
98. See, e.g., Holland, 540 P.2d at 552 (limestone); Mack Oil, 389 P.2d at 961 (fresh water);
Cronkhite, 352 P.2d at 399 (gypsum); Beck, 196 Okla. at 272, 164 P.2d at 401 (sand and gravel).
In Sloan, 547 F.2d at 116, the Tenth Circuit held coal to be part of the surface estate under its
interpretation of Oklahoma law. This decision was subsequently cited in Hutchison v. McClure,
621 P.2d 546, 546 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). In Butler, however, Justice Hargrave stated that he
found the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of state law incorrect. 53 OKLA. B.J. at 137 (Hargrave, J.,
concurring specially). See also Defendants' Trial Brief at 88-89, Randall & Blake Okla., Inc. v.
Federal Land Bank of Wichita, No. 79-258-C (E.D. Okla. 1979) (expert opinion that coal is con-
sidered a mineral by the parties to a grant or reservation of "all the oil, gas, and other minerals").
99. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Petchinsky, 438 P.2d 475, 476-77 (Okla. 1968) (owner of
permanently damaged land is entitled to difference in land value immediately before and after
damage); Ellison v. Walker, 281 P.2d 931, 933 (Okla. 1955) (owner of termporarily damaged land
1984]
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owner's duty to pay for surface damages as contractual rather than tor-
tious in nature, and thus impose damages for breach of contract. For
instance, a court may award the surface owner the cost of performance
of the mineral owner's obligation to restore the surface. 103 However, if
the implied covenant to restore the surface is found merely incidental
to the purpose of the contract, and if the cost of restoration greatly
exceeds the resulting economic benefit, the court may measure damages
by the diminution in value of the surface rather than the cost of restora-
tion."° If crops are damaged by the mineral owner, the surface owner
would be awarded the value of the crops at the time of injury.105 The
court might also require the mineral owner to pay a reasonable rent
should his activities deny the surface owner the use of the land during
the time mineral operations are being conducted. 106
Some commentators believe the manner of enjoyment theory gives
the mineral interest owner greater rights to the surface than were con-
templated by the parties. 107 The mineral operator's duty of compensa-
tion has been termed merely a "forced sale" of the surface.0 8 While
these fears are not groundless, they should not be alleviated by a defini-
tion of mineral ownership that thwarts the parties' intent to sever all
substances of value. The surface owner's interests are protected not
only by the right to compensation but by the mineral owner's duty to
restore the surface, whether statutorily10 9 or judicially t"0 imposed.
Adoption of the accommodation doctrine in Oklahoma would also al-
awarded cost to restore the land to its former condition, if less than property's value); St. Louis,
I.M. & S. Ry. v. Weldon, 39 Okla. 369, 373, 135 P. 8, 10 (1913) (owner of destroyed land receives
actual cash value at time of destruction).
103. See Rock Island Improvement Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 698 F.2d 1075, 1079 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2121 (1983); Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d
109, 114 (1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963).
104. See Peevyhouse, 392 P.2d at 114. The Tenth Circuit's contrary holding in Rock Island
was based on the court's belief that Oklahoma courts would not follow Peevyhouse if faced with a
similar case today. Rock Island, 698 F.2d at 1078-79.
105. Seeeg., Cities Service Gas Co. v. Christian, 340 P.2d 929, 936-37 (Okla. 1959).
106. See Trinity & S. Ry. v. Schofield, 72 Tex. 496, -, 10 S.W. 575, 577 (1889).
107. Harrell, Recent Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS
L. & TAX'N 327, 360-61 (1980). Professor Harrell argues that at the time of conveyance, the par-
ties are more concerned with the surface than with the mineral estate, which is speculative and
uncertain in nature. Ad
108. Comment, Surface or MineralA Single Test?, 23 BAYLOR L. REV. 407, 417 (1971).
109. See OKLA. STAT. tit 52, §§ 318.2-.9 (Supp. 1983) (requires oil and gas operators to pay
surface damages); Mining Lands Reclamation Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 45, §§ 721-738 (1981 & Supp.
1982); Coal Mining Reclamation Act of 1978, OKLA. STAT. tit. 45, §§ 742-764 (1981).
110. In Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1973), the court held that a mineral
owner or lessee has a duty during the term of the lease to restore that portion of the surface used
for extracting minerals and later abandoned. Id at 1396.
[Vol. 19:448
15
Newton: Texas Reexamines the Meaning of Minerals: Moser v. United States
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1983
MINERALS'
leviate the danger of unreasonable surface use."'
If Oklahoma courts hesitates to adopt the manner of enjoyment
theory or the Moser rule due to concern for the surface estate, they may
wish to consider variations which would keep separate the questions of
mineral ownership and surface use. Instead of giving the mineral own-
er the absolute right to remove any unnamed mineral, the court could
allow the surface owner to enjoin all unreasonable surface uses, includ-
ing methods of extraction which would destroy the surface." 2 If the
mineral owner wished to extract substances using surface-destructive
techniques, he would be forced to negotiate with the surface owner for
the right to do so." 3 Alternatively, the court could require a mineral
owner to seek judicial permission to extract unspecified minerals. Such
permission would be granted only after the court "balanced the equi-
ties" in favor of the mineral owner, and would be conditioned on pay-
ment of compensation to the surface owner." 4 While these approaches
are not without disadvantages," 15 either rule would help protect the sur-
face owner's rights to a valuable estate, free from the threat of diminu-
tion caused by removal of unnamed minerals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Moser decision is worthy of serious study and consideration
in Oklahoma. Public policy is better served by adopting either the
Moser test or Kuntz' theory. Certainty of titles will be increased by a
rule which requires fewer factual determinations to ascertain the own-
ership of a substance. Burgeoning judicial workloads and costs result-
ing from litigation would also be reduced. Further, a rule which
recognizes the mineral estate's title to all substances of value would
encourage the reasonable development of the state's natural resources.
Whether Oklahoma will recognize these advantages in the near
future is uncertain. While Kuntz' theory has been mentioned by the
courts at times, the withdrawal of the Eike I opinion may indicate a
11I. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The Tenneco decision may represent a recep-
tiveness in Oklahoma to future consideration of the accommodation doctrine.
112. Comment, Lignte-Su face or Mineral? The Single Test Causes Double Trouble, 28 BAY-
LOR L. REv. 287, 312-13 (1976); see Lowe, supra note 2, at 143; Maxwell, supra note 19, at 285.
113. Maxwell, supra note 19, at 277. Maxwell notes that the surface owner's power to block
mineral development may result in a forced sharing of the value of the mineral estate with the
surface owner. Id. at 281.
114. Id. at 285.
115. See Norvell supra note 19, at 201 (noting that they may retard mineral development and
thwart the parties' probable intention that the mineral owner be entitled to use his entire estate).
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reluctance to embrace the manner of enjoyment concept. However, the
leadership of the Texas Supreme Court in Moser may influence its
Oklahoma counterpart to adopt or fashion a similar rule.
Paul D. Newton
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